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Green or Greed?  
An Alternative Look at CEO Compensation  
and Corporate Environmental Commitment 
 
Abstract 
This study relies on environmental stewardship, a stakeholder enlarged view of stewardship theory, 
and institutional theory to analyze the relationship between CEO compensation and firms’ 
environmental commitment in a worldwide sample of 520 large listed firms. Our findings show that 
environment friendly firms pay their CEOs less total compensation and rely less on incentive-based 
compensation than environment careless firms. This negative relationship is stronger in institutional 
contexts where national environmental regulations are weaker. Our findings have important 
theoretical meaning and practical implications. Results show that CEOs do not necessarily act 
opportunistically; rather some of them may be willing to act as stewards of the natural environment 
and accept a lower, less incentive-based, compensation from environment friendly firms. This study 
also provides evidence of the important influence of the institutional context in setting-up CEO 
compensation as the relationship is stronger when national environmental regulations are weaker. 
Our findings question the universal validity of agency theory in explaining CEO compensation. 
Compensation based on pecuniary incentives might be less indicated to motivate CEOs who feel 
rewarded by playing a stewardship role for environment friendly firms. When designing 
compensation for CEOs, compensation committees and external compensation advisors should 
consider psychological and institutional factors that might affect CEO motivation.  
 
Keywords: CEO compensation, corporate social performance, corporate social responsibility, 
environmental commitment, environmental regulations, stewardship theory. 
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1. Introduction 
Environmental issues represent nowadays a major social concern. Human beings and firms 
are subject to greater public pressure to reduce their negative environmental impact (Jones, 2014). 
To react to this external pressure and strengthen relations with stakeholders, firms implement 
strategies to achieve greater environmental performance (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Berrone and 
Gomez-Meja, 2009a). There is a growing literature, based on agency theory, which argues that 
firms that want to reduce their negative environmental impact should include environmental 
performance as a criterion in setting-up CEO incentive compensation (e.g. Coombs and Gilley, 
2005; Berrone and Gomez-Meja, 2009a). According to agency theory, CEO compensation, and in 
particular its incentive-based component is a primary mechanism to create alignment of interests 
between rationally bounded principals and opportunistic agents (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Following Cuevas-Rodríguez et al. (2012), who called for alternative theoretical perspectives to 
extend agency theory outside its boundaries, we offer an alternative view by combining stakeholder 
and stewardship theories to explain the differences in CEO compensation, in terms of magnitude 
and design, between environment friendly and environment careless firms. In addition, we use the 
theoretical lenses provided by institutional theory to investigate the moderating role of the 
institutional context in a worldwide sample of 520 large listed firms. 
Agency theory mainly focuses on agency problems in a bilateral relationship, as managers are 
responsible to satisfy primarily shareholders’ interest. Its assumptions have been criticized to be too 
restrictive. According to several authors (e.g., Tirole, 2002; Cuevas-Rodríguez et al., 2012) other 
behavioral perspectives may provide more useful insights. For instance, stakeholder theory extends 
the agency theory view by suggesting that managers should attempt to meet the demands of a wide 
range of stakeholders including those of the shareholders (e.g. Freeman, 1984; Hill and Jones, 1992; 
Wood and Jones, 1995). In this view, CEO’s decisions and actions should be directed at satisfying 
all firm’s stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995; Wood and Jones, 1995; Jones and Wicks, 1999). Among 
the stakeholders, the natural environment has a vital role. Human beings and firms have a moral 
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responsibility towards the natural environment as their activities impact and are affected by the 
natural environment (Jones, 2014). By combining agency and stakeholder theories, previous 
literature suggests that firms wanting to increase their environmental commitment should provide 
their CEOs explicit incentives to engage in environmental strategies (e.g. Stanwick and Stanwick, 
2001, 2003; Cordeiro and Sarkis, 2008; Berrone and Gomez-Meja, 2009a). 
In contrast to agency theory, stewardship theory considers managers as non-opportunistic and self-
motivated. Stewardship theory is based on the idea that CEOs are guided by the imperative of doing 
the right thing even if it does not increase their personal well-being (Davis et al., 1997). By doing 
so, CEOs have intrinsic benefits not driven by economic values (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 
2009b). Stewardship theory, in the form of ‘environmental stewardship’ (Jones, 2014), can explain 
how some CEOs, and consequently the firm, may be willing to act towards the natural environment. 
According to Etzioni (1986), the behaviour of these CEOs is driven by a form of moral duty and/or 
altruism. Such CEOs have an intrinsic motivation to lead the firm to the achievement of non-self-
interested goals. To the extent that these CEOs act as stewards towards the natural environment, 
they give more importance to moral duties and intrinsic benefits and their interest for financial 
compensation is relatively weakened. Institutional theory suggests that not only performance 
outcomes, but also other factors such as social, cultural and political beliefs, industry norms, 
legislation, and management values influence the design of CEO compensation (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; Eisenhardt, 1988; Wiseman et al., 2012). 
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, it provides new insights on 
executive compensation research, which is mainly based on agency theory (e.g. Jensen and Murphy, 
1990, Tosi and Gomez-Meja, 1994; Berrone and Gomez-Meja, 2009a), by considering the 
theoretical lenses provided by stewardship, stakeholder and institutional theories. This extended 
framework provides an alternative perspective to explain CEO compensation’s design strategies 
that are not considered efficient under the restricted agency theory assumptions (e.g. Stanwick and 
Stanwick, 2001; Coombs and Gilley, 2005).  
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Second, by focusing on the firms’ commitment to the natural environment, this study answers the 
call of Johnson and Greening (1999) to investigate specific corporate social responsibility 
dimensions. We focused on the environment dimension as the natural environment is the primary 
and primordial ‘stakeholder’ of the firm (Driscoll and Starik, 2004; Jones, 2014). Several authors 
(e.g., Stanwick and Stanwick, 2001; Coombs and Gilley, 2005; Cordeiro and Sarkis, 2008, Berrone 
and Gomez-Meja, 2009a) have called for more investigation in this as it is unclear whether the link 
between environmental performance and CEO compensation is symbolic, rather than substantial, 
and positive, rather than negative.  
Third, by using a worldwide sample of large listed firms belonging to different institutional settings, 
this study extends the generalizability of the results compared to studies that adopted a single 
institutional setting. Several studies had pointed that the institutional context is likely to affect 
corporate social responsibility (Matten and Moon, 2008; Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010) as well as 
corporate governance practices (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003) and, in particular, CEO compensation 
(Filatotchev and Allcock, 2010). 
Fourth, we evaluate firms’ environmental commitment by using a comprehensive environmental 
performance measure. Our measure is based on the scores compiled by the Sustainable Investment 
Research International Company (hereafter SiriPro) – the world’s largest company specializing in 
the analysis of socially responsible performance.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the literature review and hypothesis 
development. Section 3 illustrates the research methodology, followed by the findings in Section 4. 
The discussion and conclusions are presented in Sections 5 and 6. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development  
External pressure regarding environmental issues has resulted in an increasing motivation for 
individuals and firms to adopt environmental practices (Buysse and Verbeke, 2003; Eesley and 
Lenox, 2006; Sarkis et al., 2010; Endrikat, et al. 2014; Jones, 2014).  
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To respond to these pressures, according to a combined view of agency and stakeholder theories, 
CEOs compensation should be explicitly linked to environmental performance so that it provides 
CEOs the incentive to pursue environmental goals (Berrone and Gomez-Meja, 2009a).  
Present research on the relationship between CEO compensation and environmental performance is 
scarce. Most studies have focused on the US institutional context and found mixed evidence. On the 
one hand, Cordeiro and Sarkis (2008) found that environmental performance influences CEO 
compensation levels only in firms where there is an explicit linkage between environmental 
performance and CEO compensation. Berrone and Gomez-Meja (2009a) focused on firms operating 
in environmentally sensitive sectors. They found that firms enjoying good environmental 
performance reward their CEOs accordingly. On the other hand, Stanwick and Stanwick (2001) and 
Coombs and Gilley (2005) found an inverse relationship between CEO compensation and 
environmental reputation/performance. By adopting a stakeholder enlarged view of agency theory, 
they interpreted their findings by arguing that firms with higher environmental performance gave 
CEOs incentives to decrease their focus on environmental strategies. However, other theories may 
provide alternative explanations for this evidence. 
 
2.1. Theoretical framework 
The adoption of contractual mechanisms to provide CEO incentives to pursue stakeholders’ 
interests is based on the assumptions that CEOs act in a self-interest, opportunistic, rational way. 
These assumptions rule out the possibility that CEOs, as any individual, may in fact obtain 
emotional or social benefit in fulfilling stakeholders’ expectations. However, individuals – 
including CEOs – may have reasons for pursuing goals other than their own self-interest. As Sen 
(1987: 85) argues, ‘behavior is ultimately a social matter’… ‘thinking in terms of what ‘we’ should 
do, or what should be ‘our’ strategy, may reflect a sense of identity involving recognition of other 
people’s goals and the mutual interdependencies involved’. It can be part of rationality that an 
individual could try to do his/her best to achieve what s/he would like to achieve, and this can also 
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include the promotion of non-self-interested goals which s/he may value and wish to aim at (Sen, 
1987). This notion of rationality is in line with the assumptions of stewardship theory, which 
predicts that individuals, including CEOs, essentially want to do ‘the right thing’, as they are far 
from being opportunistic (e.g. Donaldson and Davis, 1989; Davis et al., 1997). CEOs may act as 
stewards who perceive greater utility in adopting pro-organizational and collectivistic, rather than 
individualistic and merely self-serving behaviors (Davis et al., 1997). Stewardship theory assumes 
that individuals identify themselves with the mission of the organization and/or are intrinsically 
motivated to pursue organizational goals. Individuals who are intrinsically motivated may perform 
an activity without ‘apparent rewards except the activity itself’ (Deci, 1971: 105). By pursuing 
organizational goals and attributing the organizational successes to themselves, CEOs increase their 
‘self-image and self-concept’ (Davis et al., 1997). Stewardship theory can explain not only the 
commitment of CEOs towards the shareholders, but also their commitment towards other 
stakeholders (Godos-Díez et al., 2011), such as the natural environment, which is the primary and 
primordial stakeholder (Driscoll and Stark, 2004, Jones, 2014). According to Jones, (2014: p. 23), 
human beings are stewards of the natural environment. They, as the dominant species on the planet, 
have the moral duty to protect, enhance if possible, but certainly not deplete the world’s natural 
resources (Jones, 2014). This behaviour is in line with the concept of environmental stewardship as 
an ethical duty. Human beings shall take care of the natural environment because, according to their 
set of moral values, this is the right thing to do (Etzioni, 1986). Human beings might also undertake 
environmentally sound actions because they enjoy acting in this way, as they receive an intrinsic 
(i.e. non-pecuniary) reward in acting in this manner, such as a moral satisfaction or a social 
approval (Andreoni, 1989; Holländer, 1990). 
Stewardship theory can incorporate an institutional perspective, thereby giving explicit recognition 
to the social contexts surrounding corporate social responsibility (Aguilera et al., 2007). The 
institutional context may influence the development and the diffusion of corporate social 
responsible practices (e.g,, Jones, 1999; Matten and Moon, 2008; Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010). 
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Institutional theory addresses the embeddedness of firms in a nexus of formal and informal rules 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). These rules range from strict regulations to less formal constraints. 
The institutional perspective on corporate social responsibility suggests that firms’ social and 
environmental strategies are influenced by the diversity of institutional settings and social and 
environmental regulations (Jones, 1999; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Matten and Moon, 2008; 
Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010). Thus, CEOs’ environmental stewardship can be affected by the 
institutional context surrounding the firm. 
Therefore, we derive our hypotheses from stewardship theory. We also investigate the role of 
national environmental regulations as institutional moderator of the relationship between firm’s 
environmental commitment/performance and CEO compensation. 
 
2.2. Hypotheses’ development  
Relying on stewardship theory, we predict that CEOs who see themselves as stewards of the natural 
environment do not act in a merely self-interested way; rather they pursue non-self-interested goals. 
These CEOs may act in such a way because they are intrinsically motivated, either by an ethical 
duty or an altruistic attitude. Previous studies argued that people working in non-profit 
organizations are intrinsically motivated by the desire to perform the organizational tasks and 
pecuniary incentives play a less important role (e.g. Frank, 2003; Benz, 2005; Jobome, 2006; Ben-
Ner et al., 2010). Similarly, firms that aim at social and environmental goals are likely to select 
those CEOs who are self-motivated and whose interests are naturally aligned with those of the firm 
(e.g. Frank, 2003; McGuire et al., 2003; Brekke and Nyborg, 2008; Berrone and Gomez Meja, 
2009b; Cai et al. 2011; Grolleau et al. 2012). These CEOs will avoid firms that strictly adopt a 
single "bottom-line"1 approach (McGuire et al., 2003). As CEOs are recognized organizational 
leaders, their environmental commitment will lead other directors and employees to act in the same 
way towards the natural environment (e.g., Hernandez, 2008). This will in turn influence the ethical 
climate within the firm (e.g., Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009a, Blome and Paulraj, 2013). Indeed, 
9 
 
social performance has been found to be primarily due to managerial beliefs of corporate culture 
(McGuire et al, 2003). Therefore, the CEO and the whole firm will try to serve as stewards of the 
natural environment (Jones, 2014).  
From this perspective, the adoption of incentive-based compensation to managers may be 
ineffective and, even worst, might crowd out intrinsic incentives and/or pro-social behaviors (e.g. 
Frey and Jegen, 2001; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Bénabou and Tirole 2003; Cuevas-Rodríguez et al., 
2012; Ims et al., 2014).  If CEOs serve as stewards, there is less of a need to use explicit incentives 
to align their interest with those of the stakeholders, as their interests are already focused on 
organizational, rather than personal aims. Moreover, explicit incentives, such as financial rewards, 
aim at directing managers’ attention towards shareholders and can detract them from serving the 
interests of other ‘principals’, like the natural environment (Deutsch and Valente, 2013). Explicit 
incentives may also decrease the individual’s willingness to allocate time and efforts towards social 
activities, as they reduce the sense of control s/he has over his (her) actions (Berrone and Gomez 
Meja, 2009b). Thus, incentive-based compensation can weaken individual’s intrinsic incentives and 
produce unintended negative consequences (Ims et al., 2014). According to this perspective, 
socially concerned firms have been found to rely more on lower-powered incentive contracts, such 
as salaries, than non-socially concerned firms (e.g. Frye et al., 2006; Kopel and Brand, 2013). 
Therefore, we expect that: 
 
H1. Environment friendly firms are less likely to pay their CEO with incentive-based compensation. 
 
Environment friendly firms might rely less on compensation to reward their CEO, as CEOs might 
be already intrinsically rewarded by the contribution they give to safeguard the natural environment. 
This is coherent with the concept of ‘impure’ altruism: people increase their utility from the act of 
giving (Andreoni, 1989). CEOs who have internalized non-monetary values into their preferences 
might, thus, prefer working for firms regarded as responsible towards the natural environment as 
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they get an intrinsic reward by working for them (Brekke and Nyborg, 2008). Assuming that 
individuals’ utility increases with their altruistic behavior, firms regarded as responsible towards the 
natural environment are more likely to pay their CEO less and these CEOs accept such lower 
compensation as they are likely to gain an intrinsic benefits from their job, when compared with 
CEOs of environmental careless firms. 
CEOs that act as stewards are likely to be willing to accept a relatively lower compensation than 
CEOs that are motivated only by self-interested considerations, as the former gain more intrinsic 
benefits from their job (Benz, 2005; Wasserman, 2006; Moriarty, 2009). These CEOs are hence 
more willing to accept lower pecuniary compensation in socially concerned firms, such as firms 
committed to environmental sustainability, as they strive to get a moral satisfaction, that they would 
not obtain in non-socially concerned firms (e.g. Brekke and Nyborg, 2008; Nyborg and Zhang, 
2013). For instance, people who work in non-profit organizations have been found to receive lower 
compensation in comparison with those working in for-profit firms (e.g. Frank, 2003; Benz, 2005). 
This supports the assumption that people working in socially concerned firms seem to be motivated 
by reasons other than pecuniary (Benz, 2005). Therefore, in setting CEO compensation, board of 
directors of these firms should pay more attention to psychological factors that underlie CEOs’ 
motivation to pursue the goals of the firm (Jobome, 2006). By contrast, the board of directors of 
firms that are less socially-concerned might need to offer a compensating wage premium to 
motivate their CEOs as they do not to get any additional intrinsic benefit from their work (Frank, 
2003). CEO compensation is at best the result from an arm’s length negotiation between the board 
of directors and the CEO2. In this negotiation both the board of directors and the CEO should act as 
fiduciary for stakeholders and place the firms’ interests ahead of their own interests (Moriarty, 
2009). On one hand, the board of directors has the fiduciary duty to attempt to design the most cost-
efficient compensation packages in order to attract, retain, and motivate CEOs to maximize firm 
value (Jensen et al. 2004). On the other hand, the CEO has the fiduciary duty not to seek and accept 
a compensation that is higher than the amount necessary to be attracted, retained and motivated to 
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maximize firm value (Moriarty, 2009). This fiduciary duty explains why in environment friendly 
firms CEOs, who are intrinsically rewarded by working for these firms, may be more willing to 
accept a lower compensation than CEOs in less environment friendly firms.  Therefore, we expect 
that: 
 
H2. Environment friendly firms are more likely to pay their CEO less.  
 
The institutional context may influence corporate social responsible practices (Jones, 1999; Matten 
and Moon, 2008; Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010). According to institutional theory firms are 
embedded in a nexus of formal and informal rules (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). These rules range 
from strict political regulations to less formal constraints. Firms’ environmental strategies are 
influenced by the diversity of institutional settings and environmental regulations (Fiorino, 2006; 
Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010). Strong mandatory environmental regulations are created to 
exercise pressure on firms’ environmental commitment.  Thus, in these institutional settings, even 
self-interested CEOs might pursue environmental corporate strategies to comply with the regulation 
and avoid fines, liabilities and litigation costs (Kock et al. 2012).  By contrast, in countries where 
firms’ environmental commitment is not strongly regulated, more room exists for firms to develop 
environmentally sound strategies on a voluntary basis. The potential motivations behind the 
voluntary adoption of corporate environment friendly initiatives are manifold. Environmentally 
sound initiatives may help firms improving their efficiency in the manufacturing processes and/or 
attract more profitable consumers, such as environment-concerned consumers. They may also 
contribute to respond to stakeholders’ pressures or to pursue ethical and social values (Lyon and 
Maxwell, 1999; Bansal and Roth, 2000; Endrikat et al. 2014). Environment friendly firms operating 
in countries with a weak environmental protection need to be managed by CEOs with an 
environmental vision. These CEOs will be self-motivated in developing environment-oriented 
strategies as they are willing to act as stewards of the natural environment, despite the lack of strict 
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environmental regulations. CEOs who act as stewards of the natural environment get intrinsic 
benefits in pursuing corporate environmental sustainability and are willing to accept a lower 
compensation. There is also less of need to use incentive-based compensation than when CEOs 
pursue environmental strategies mainly to comply with regulations. As the need to have CEOs with 
an environmental vision is greater in an institutional context where firms’ environmental 
commitment is not strictly regulated,  it is likely that environment friendly firms rely less on 
incentive-based compensation (and more on fixed salaries) and pay their CEOs less than 
environment friendly firms whose environmental commitment is mandated by national 
environmental regulations. Therefore, we expect that: 
 
H3a. The negative relation between environment friendly firms and the use of incentive-based 
compensation to pay CEOs is stronger in firms that are headquartered in countries with weaker 
environmental regulations. 
 
H3b. The negative relation between environment friendly firms and CEO compensation is stronger 
in firms that are headquartered in countries with weaker environmental regulations. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Sample and data gathering 
Our sample is drawn from several databases. The SiriPro database is assembled by 
Sustainable Investment Research International (SIRI), the world’s largest firm specializing in 
socially responsible investment analysis. SIRI corporate social performance (CSP) evaluation is not 
provided upon firm request, therefore avoiding self-selection bias (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). 
Firms included in the SiriPro database are then matched with those whose CEO compensation is 
available in the BoardEx database. We drop both the firms for which a CEO could not be identified 
and the firms with a CEO who left during the financial year. This lead to a sample of 601 non-
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financial listed firms. Firms’ financial performance data (ROA and stock return), risk, size, leverage 
and industry classification were collected using Osiris database. Because of missing and extreme 
values3 in those variables we lost 81 observations. Our final sample is composed of 520 non-
financial listed firms headquartered in 17 countries. 
 
3.2 Model 
To test our hypotheses we used OLS regression models with industry-fixed effects (µi). In 
particular, the following two models were adopted to test, respectively, hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 
2:  
(1) 
iii
i0i
εµ variablescontrol δ                                                
(EP) eperformanc talEnvironmen βα  oncompensati based-Incentive
+++
++=
 
(2) 
iii
i0i
εµ variablescontrol δ                                      
(EP) eperformanc ntal Environmeβα  oncompensati Total
+++
++=
 
To test hypotheses 3a and 3b we add the interaction term Environmental Performance (EP) × 
Environmental Regulatory Regime Index (ERRI). This allows to analyse the moderating role played 
by the institutional setting on the relationship between firms’ environmental performance and CEO 
compensation.  
 
 
(3) 
iii
ii3i2i10i
εµ variablescontrol δ                                                     
ERRI EP βERRI βEP βα   oncompensati based-Incentive
+++
×+++=
 
(4) 
iii
ii3i2i10i
εµ variablescontrol δ                                     
ERRI EP βERRI βEP βα   oncompensati Total
+++
+×+++=
 
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
The dependent variables in our regression models are based on the 2009 CEO compensation. To 
test our hypotheses, we consider two CEO compensation measures: the proportion of incentive-
based compensation and total compensation. Consistent with previous studies (e.g. Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990), total CEO compensation was measured as the sum of CEO salary, bonus, the value 
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of equity based compensation (valued at the year-end closing stock price) and other compensation, 
as reported in the BoardEx database. The natural logarithm of this variable was used to offset 
skewness in the distribution. The proportion of incentive-based compensation was measured as the 
ratio between equity-based compensation and CEO total compensation.  
 
3.2.2. Independent variables 
Environmental performance (EP). To estimate the degree of firms’ commitment to 
environmental sustainability we used the SiriPro “environmental performance” (EP) ratings. SiriPro 
performs this analysis based on actual performance, reporting procedures, policies and guidelines, 
management systems and other key data. The necessary information is extracted from financial 
accounts, corporate documentation, international databases, media reports, interviews with key 
stakeholders and ongoing contact with management. The information extracted from each firm is 
condensed into 62 information items on the environmental impact. SiriPro evaluates the 
environmental impact in four areas: levels of transparency in public reports and communications 
(2); the existence of corporate policies and principles (5); the importance of management systems 
(27) and the level of the firm’s environmental performance (28). Therefore, the SiriPro 
“environmental performance” index, comprises both measures of commitment (e.g., the existence 
of corporate policies and principles, an environmental management system, etc.), and performance 
(e.g., CO2eq emissions, renewable energy consumption, air emissions, and so on). Each issue is 
given a score ranging from 0 (worst) to 100 (best). Importantly, each information item is weighted 
according to a methodology developed by SiriPro. Environmental performance (EP) is measured at 
the end of the previous financial year. The list of the 62 items is reported in the appendix.  
 
Environmental Regulatory Regime Index (ERRI). We test the moderating influence of the 
institutional setting on the relationship between firms’ environmental commitment/performance and 
CEO compensation by measuring the level of each country’s set of environmental regulations with 
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the Environmental Regulatory Regime Index (ERRI) as in Esty and Porter (2005). This index 
measures the level of country environmental regulations quality considering the following elements: 
a) stringency of standards; b) sophistication of the regulatory structure; c) subsidization of natural 
resources and d) strictness of regulatory enforcement. The ‘stringency of standards’ measures the 
perceived rigor of countries’ regulations on air pollution, water pollution, toxic waste, and 
chemicals. The ‘sophistication of the regulatory structure’ measures the degree to which countries’ 
environmental regulations are flexible, clear, consistent and structured to encourage 
competitiveness, and designed to promote cooperative, rather than adversarial, business-government 
relations. The ‘subsidization of natural resources’ measures the extent to which a country subsidizes 
energy and other materials. The ‘strictness of regulatory enforcement’ measures how aggressively a 
country’s environmental regulations are enforced.  
Table 1 lists the 17 countries included in our sample according to their ERRI scores. 
Finland. Sweden, Singapore, Netherland and Austria are among the most regulated countries 
towards the environment. By contrast, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ireland and Norway are the least 
regulated. We coded each firm in the sample according to the ERRI score of the country in which 
the firm is headquartered.  
INSERT TABLE 1 
3.2.3 Control variables 
We also control for the following variables: 
- Firm size: Previous studies show that larger firms are able to pay more attention to their 
stakeholders (Waddock and Graves, 1999; Mc Williams and Siegel, 2001; Cai et al., 2011). Firm 
size is also an important determinant of CEO compensation because larger firms hire CEOs with 
superior skills (Rosen, 1982) and CEOs who are risk averse, prefer linking their pay to a stable 
factor such as firm’s size, rather than performance (Tosi et al., 2000). Firm size is measured as the 
natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the previous financial year. 
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- Financial performance is known to be an important driver of CEO compensation (Hall and 
Liebman, 1988). Several studies support the existence of a positive relationship between financial 
performance and corporate social performance (Callan and Thomas, 2011). Financial performance 
is measured by the accounting and market performance (ROA and stock return, in percentages) 
during the previous financial year. 
- Financial leverage: The level of debt may influence firms’ likelihood to use CEO 
compensation as a tool for solving the agency problem (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). It is measured 
as the ratio of total debt on total assets at the end of the previous financial year. 
- Firm risk: Previous research shows the existence of a complex and non-linear relationship 
between firm risk and both total compensation and the use of performance-contingent compensation 
for CEOs (Miller et al., 2002). Risk is measured by using the firm’s market beta at the end of the 
previous financial year.  
- Industry: Risks and opportunities for improving environmental performance vary across 
industries (Russo and Fouts, 1997; McGuire et al., 2003; Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009a). 
Moreover, industry mean compensation is used as a benchmark by which investigating whether a 
CEO’s compensation is in line with that of peers (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Aggarwal and Rajesh, 
1999). We group firms following the one-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes. Thus, 
Industry is a set of dichotomous variables that are equal to 1 if the firm belongs to a given i industry 
and 0 otherwise.  
 
4. Results 
4.1. Sample descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the level of CEO compensation in the whole sample 
and in the 17 countries analyzed. On average, CEOs receive a total compensation of $10 million 
dollars (median value around $7 million), with incentive-based compensation accounting for more 
than 27% of total compensation. Consistently with previous studies (e.g. Fernandes et al., 2013) 
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firms headquartered in the US, followed by UK firms, are those  with the highest paid CEOs and 
that use incentive-based compensation the most. By contrast, CEOs are paid the least in Spanish 
and Portuguese firms. Incentive-based compensation was never adopted by Austrian, Italian and 
Spanish firms.  
INSERT TABLE 2 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on the level of firm’s environmental performance and 
the other variables considered in the study. Firm’ environmental performance has mean and median 
values around the middle of its range of definition (45.0 and 44.3, respectively). With respect to 
financial performance, ROA mean and median values are above 5%, while stock return mean and 
median values are below -37%, due to the share price drop in 2008. Firm size ranges from $142 
million to $372 billion in total assets, with mean and median values of $21 and $7.7 billion, 
respectively. Firm leverage is, on average, higher than 60% and Beta risk is, on average, close to 1. 
Half of the firms in the sample operate in the light and heavy manufacturing industries. 
INSERT TABLE 3 
Multicollinearity diagnostics, using VIFs (maximum VIF value 2.97, average VIF value 
1.76) and the correlation between the independent variables (see table 4), indicate that 
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a concern. 
INSERT TABLE 4 
The correlation matrix shows that firms that exhibit a higher environmental 
performance/commitment and firms headquartered in countries with a stronger environmental 
regulation use less incentive-based compensation and pay their CEOs the least. Conversely, larger 
firms and those with higher stock returns pay their CEOs the most. The use of incentive-based 
compensation is positively associated with stock market returns. Firms operating in the agriculture, 
mining and construction industry exhibit a lower environmental performance/commitment. On the 
other hand, firms in the transportation, communication and utilities industry show a higher score of 
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environmental performance. Environmental performance is not significantly correlated with 
accounting or market performance.   
  
 4.2. Multivariate analysis  
Table 5 reports the results of the regression analyses. In Models 1 and 3 the dependent 
variable is the CEO incentive-based compensation ratio, while in Models 2 and 4 the dependent 
variable is the CEO total compensation.  
INSERT TABLE 5 
We find that firms with a higher environmental commitment used significantly less 
incentive-based compensation and paid their CEO significantly less than firms with a lower 
environmental commitment. Indeed, as shown in Table 5, firms’ environmental performance (EP) is 
negatively and significantly associated with both the incentive-based compensation ratio (p<0.01) 
and the total level of CEO compensation (p<0.01). Thus both hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported.  
We also find that the relationship between environmental performance (EP) and the 
incentive-based compensation ratio and the total level of CEO compensation is moderated by 
country’s environmental regulations. More specifically, the negative relationship is significantly 
stronger in institutional contexts where national environmental regulations are weaker. As reported 
in Table 5, the coefficients for the interaction term between firms’ environmental performance (EP) 
and the Environmental Regulatory Regime Index (ERRI) are positive and significant both in model 
3, where the dependent variable is the incentive-based compensation ratio (p<0.05), and model 4, 
where the dependent variable is the total CEO compensation (p<0.01). Thus, support is provided for 
hypotheses 3a and 3b. Firms committed to the environment use incentive-based compensation and 
pay their CEO the least in institutional contexts where weaker national environmental regulations 
are in place.   
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We also find that larger and riskier firms, firms with higher stock market performance, firms 
headquartered in countries with weaker environmental regulations pay their CEOs significantly 
more and used significantly more incentive-based compensation. 
 
5. Discussion 
This paper contributes to the academic literature on CEO compensation in socially-
concerned firms (e.g., Riahi-Belkaoui, 1992; Stanwick and Stanwick, 2001; McGuire et al., 2003; 
Coombs and Gilley, 2005; Cordeiro and Sarkis, 2008; Cai et al., 2011; Miles and Miles, 2013) by 
investigating the relationship between firms’ environmental commitment and CEO compensation in 
a worldwide sample of 520 large listed firms. Based on a stakeholder-enlarged view of stewardship 
theory, this study provides empirical evidence that environment friendly firms use lower levels of 
total compensation and financial incentives to pay their CEOs.   
This study extends the literature in three ways. First, it provides empirical evidence from a 
worldwide sample of non-financial listed firms, while previous studies focused exclusively on US 
firms (Stanwick and Stanwick, 2001; Coombs and Gilley, 2005; Cordeiro and Sarkis, 2008; 
Berrone and Gomez-Meja, 2009a).  
Second, we answer the call of previous studies to widen and complement agency theory with 
other theoretical frameworks (e.g. Tirole, 2002; Cuevas Rodriguez et al., 2012). Previous studies on 
CEO compensation and environmental strategies (Stanwick and Stanwick, 2001; Coombs and 
Gilley, 2005; Cordeiro and Sarkis, 2008, Berrone and Gomez-Meja, 2009a) adopted a stakeholder-
agency theoretical framework and interpreted the results accordingly. These studies explained the 
negative relationship between CEO compensation and firms’ environmental performance as a signal 
that firm’s remuneration policies do not encourage CEOs to be environment friendly (Stanwick and 
Stanwick, 2001). By contrast, our study provides an alternative explanation by relying on a 
stakeholder-enlarged view of stewardship theory. Stewardship theory assumes that individuals, 
including CEOs, place higher values on pro-organisational and collectivistic behaviours than on 
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individualistic and self-serving goals (e.g., Donaldson and Davis, 1989; Davis et al., 1997; 
Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003; Hernandez, 2008; Godos-Díez et al., 2011). Stewardship theory 
can explain the commitment of CEOs towards shareholders and other stakeholders (Godos-Díez et 
al., 2011), such as the natural environment. When applied to the natural environment, stewardship 
theory assumes that individuals have a moral responsibility to provide a service towards it (Jones, 
2014). This study provides new insights that explain a negative relationship between the use of 
incentive-based compensation and environmental performance. By taking an environmental 
stewardship perspective, this study points out that environment friendly firms are likely to rely less 
on incentive-based plans to pay their CEO as these executives are likely to have their interests 
already aligned with the environmental goals because they have a moral duty to safeguard the 
natural environment and receive intrinsic rewards from doing this. In such a context, financial 
rewards might not only be ineffective (Jobome, 2006), but also have an adverse effect on CEOs 
intrinsic commitment (Frey and Jegen, 2001; Ben-Ner et al., 2010; Ims et al., 2014).   
Environmental stewardship also provides an explanation of why CEOs of environment- 
friendly firms freely accept lower financial compensation compared to CEOs of environment-
careless firms. If some CEOs act as stewards towards the natural environment, then it can be argued 
that these CEOs obtain private enjoyment and utility from this commitment. They are hence willing 
to trade-off financial compensation for such intrinsic rewards, a privilege that they would not obtain 
in non-socially concerned firms (e.g. Frank, 2003; Benz, 2005; Brekke and Nyborg, 2008; Nyborg 
and Zhang, 2013). It could be argued that the board of directors could take advantages of these 
CEOs who have an ethical character by paying them less. However, we argue that it is unlikely for 
the board of directors to financially exploit the CEO, as CEO compensation is the result of a 
negotiation which is much more likely to be dominated by the CEO’s rather than by the board 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2003).   
We also argue that these CEOs see the ethical value in trading less compensation for a better 
environment. They feel they have the moral duty to place the firms’ and society’s interests ahead of 
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their own interests (Moriarty, 2009). The board of directors has the fiduciary duty to optimize CEO 
compensation. Consequently, it should pay less compensation to those CEOs who receive intrinsic 
rewards (Wasserman, 2006). At the same time, the CEO has the fiduciary duty to not accept a 
compensation that is higher than the amount necessary to be attracted, retained and motivated to 
maximize firm value (Moriarty, 2009).  
Finally, in line with institutional theory, this study contributes to the literature on the 
relationship between environmental commitment and institutional context (e.g., Bansal and 
Clelland, 2004; Berrone and Gomez-Meja, 2009a) and supports the view that organizational 
practices, such as CEO compensation, are influenced by the level of regulations in which a firm is 
institutionally embedded (e.g., Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009a; Cuevas-Rodríguez et al., 2012). 
We find that the relationship between firms’ environmental commitment and CEO compensation is 
significantly influenced by the level of national environmental regulations in which a firm is 
institutionally embedded. More specifically, institutional contexts characterized by weaker 
environmental regulations and more room for firm’s voluntary initiatives drive firms to hire 
environment friendly CEOs that rely less on financial compensation and more on intrinsic rewards. 
In these institutional contexts, CEOs will have more opportunities to undertake environmentally 
sound actions and fulfil their desire to act as true stewards of the natural environment.  
 
Practical implications 
Our findings provide important practical implications. Compensation committees and compensation 
consultants should take into account the CEO’s moral duties and intrinsic benefits in pursuing 
organizational goals, when designing CEO compensation. In particular, this study suggests that 
incentive-based compensation is less important in environment friendly firms as their CEOs, being 
stewards of the environment, are likely to be intrinsically motivated in pursuing environmental 
goals. This is particularly important for firms in institutional contexts with weak environment 
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regulations where the adoption of environmental strategies is due to voluntary initiatives rather than 
to a mere compliance with environmental regulation.  
 
Limitations 
Our study faces the following limitations and sets opportunities for future research. First, as 
in previous studies (e.g., Deckop et al., 2006; Cordeiro and Sarkis, 2008; Miles and Miles, 2013), 
the present research considers a short time horizon. The influence of firms’ environmental 
commitment on CEO compensation could be better explained in a broader longitudinal analysis. 
Second, we focused our analysis on CEOs of large international listed firms. Our findings may not 
be generalizable to smaller firms. Third we focused on one dimension of corporate social 
responsibility: environmental commitment and performance. Results might be different when other 
specific corporate social responsibility dimensions, such as corporate business ethics, are analyzed. 
In addition, the environmental index adopted combines firm’s environmental commitment and 
performance in a single measure, so we were unable to provide a deeper analysis. Fourth, given the 
lack of available data on the location of the firms’ facilities, we considered the national 
environmental regulation of the country where the firm’s head offices are located. However, we 
acknowledge that firms’ environmental commitment and performance might also be affected by the 
national environmental laws of the country that hosts the production facilities. Future research could 
address these issues. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Results show a negative relationship between firms’ environmental commitment and CEO 
compensation (in terms of total compensation and proportion of incentive-based compensation).  
This relationship is moderated by national environmental regulations. Environment friendly firms 
pay their CEOs less and use less incentive-based compensation in institutional contexts where 
environmental regulations are less strict.  
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These findings provide support to environmental stewardship, a stakeholder enlarged view of 
stewardship theory, as well as to institutional theory. This study contributes to the debate on the use 
of incentive-based compensation to encourage the achievement of social and environmental goals. 
It suggests that CEOs opportunism should not always be assumed when setting up their 
compensation. Environment friendly firms tend to use lower levels of total compensation and 
financial incentives to pay their CEOs. In this way, they risk restricting the pool of talent they are 
able to attract but they are also more likely to select those candidates that better fit their 
environmental vision. The CEOs they recruit might act as stewards of the natural environment and 
receive intrinsic benefits by managing environment friendly firms. Our findings also suggest that 
the characteristics of the institutional context in which a firm is embedded should be taken into 
consideration in designing CEO compensation.   
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APPENDIX 
SiriPro - Environmental commitment/performance index 
  
Public Reports and Communications 
1. Public reporting on environmental issues 
2. Public reporting externally verified 
Principles and Policies 
3. Environmental policy 
4. Formal policy statement on green procurement 
5. Formal policy statement on use of certified forestry product 
6. Public position statement on transport and climate change 
7. Public position statement on energy mix 
Management Systems 
8. Percentage of ISO 14001 certified sites 
9. Targets and programs for environmental improvement of suppliers 
10. Targets and programs for CO2eq emission reduction and/or energy consumption 
11. Targets and programs to increase the use of renewable energy 
12. Targets and programs to reduce air emissions 
13. Targets and programs to reduce hazardous waste generation 
14. Targets and programs to reduce non-hazardous waste generation 
15. Targets and programs to reduce discharge to water 
16. Targets and programs to reduce water consumption 
17. Targets and programs to reduce material consumption 
18. Targets and programs to phase out use of hazardous substances 
19. Targets and programs to phase out CFC's /HCFC's in refrigeration equipment 
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20. Targets and programs to replace chlorine bleaching 
21. Targets and programs to increase percentage of certified pulp/wood operations 
22. Targets and programs to increase use of environmentally-friendly paper 
23. Targets and programs to improve the environmental performance of fleet and transport 
24. Targets and programs to reduce emissions of transport means 
25. Targets and programs to reduce the noise characteristics of transport 
26. Targets and programs to phase out production of hazardous substances 
27. Targets and programs to reduce the energy consumption of products 
28. Targets and programs to reduce the impact of product at the end of the production cycle 
29. Targets and programs to reduce the environmental toxicity of product 
30. Targets and programs to reduce packaging materials 
31. Targets and programs to increase the sale of eco-labeled/organic products 
32. Targets and programs to reduce CO2eq emissions of the fleet 
33. Programs that offer favorable financial conditions for environmentally friendly projects 
34. Programs to take into account environmental impact of products in investment decision 
Performance 
35. Percentage of ISO 14001 certified suppliers 
36. Data on CO2eq emissions 
37. Data on renewable energy consumption 
38. Data on air emissions 
39. Data on hazardous waste generation 
40. Data on non-hazardous waste 
41. Data on discharge to water 
42. Data on oil spills 
43. Data on water consumption 
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44. Data on material consumption 
45. Data on percentage of certified pulp or wood of total consumption/production 
46. Data on percentage of recycled fiber as raw material 
47. Percentage of FSC paper 
48. Percentage of recycled paper used 
49. Percentage of renewable energy sold 
50. Data on assets managed according to SRI criteria 
51. Data on total amount of environmental fines and penalties 
52. Total land disturbed and not yet rehabilitated 
53. Percentage of sales from eco-labeled/organic products 
54. Environmentally friendly construction materials 
55. Environmentally friendly building products 
56. Products beneficial to the environment 
57. Percentage of loans with detailed environmental examination 
58. Percentage of environmentally oriented loans 
59. Percentage of transactions with detailed environmental examination 
60. Percentage of transactions with high environmental benefits 
61. Percentage of investments in non-listed pioneer companies with high environmental 
benefits 
62. Percentage of premium volumes or number of policies with environmental incentives 
 
                                                          
1
 As opposed to ‘triple bottom line’. 
2 At worst, as pointed out by Bebchuk and Fried (2003), the compensation process is dominated by the CEO’s interests. 
Boards do not engage in arms’ length negotiations with the CEO over compensation, because they lack the 
independence, adequate time and easy access to accurate and unbiased information. Moreover, also board members who 
sit in the compensation committee have economic and social incentives to favor CEOs (e.g., Murphy, 1999).  
3
 We used the interquartile range rule to identify outliers.  
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Table 1 - Environmental regulatory regime index (ERRI) by country 
 
Country  Score 
1 Finland 2.303 
2 Sweden 1.772 
3 Singapore 1.171 
4 Netherlands 1.747 
5 Austria 1.641 
6 Switzerland 1.631 
7 Germany 1.522 
8 France 1.464 
9 Denmark 1.384 
10 United Kingdom 1.185 
11 United States 1.184 
12 Belgium 1.159 
13 Norway 1.045 
14 Ireland 0.546 
15 Italy 0.498 
16 Spain 0.437 
17 Portugal -0.028 
   
Source: Esty and Porter (2005). 
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics. CEO compensation per country 
    Total compensation ($ 000) Incentive-based compensation ratio 
 
Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max 
Austria 2 2,077.0 2,077.0 1,324.0 1,140.0 3,013.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Belgium 8 1,915.0 1,293.0 1,460.0 605.0 4,205.0 0.22 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.92 
Denmark 3 3,038.7 2,000.0 2,082.3 1,680.0 5,436.0 0.28 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.83 
Finland 6 3,229.0 1,273.0 4,698.0 901.0 12,779.0 0.12 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.69 
France 27 5,104.0 4,050.0 3,987.0 498.0 17,605.0 0.27 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.85 
Germany 32 4,661.4 3,708.0 3,851.8 537.0 14,419.0 0.11 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.62 
Ireland 5 3,884.2 2,715.0 2,384.7 1,658.0 6,787.0 0.33 0.40 0.29 0.00 0.70 
Italy 7 4,555.0 5,114.0 2,583.0 820.0 7,134.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Netherlands 26 2,930.2 2,263.0 2,282.6 618.0 9,342.0 0.34 0.38 0.27 0.00 0.79 
Norway 4 1,330.0 1,316.0 320.0 1,021.0 1,667.0 0.19 0.14 0.22 0.00 0.45 
Portugal 3 1,249.0 988.0 895.0 513.0 2,246.0 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.17 
Singapore 1 31,054.0 31,054.0  .  31,054.0 31,054.0 0.93 0.93 . 0.93 0.93 
Spain 4 510.0 487.0 272.0 221.0 846.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sweden 16 1,712.0 1,523.0 827.0 724.0 3,456.0 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.25 
Switzerland 24 4,477.8 1,793.0 6,513.4 216.0 27,293.0 0.29 0.01 0.38 0.00 1.00 
United Kingdom 75 6,004.8 4,682.0 4,477.6 859.0 19,720.0 0.52 0.61 0.23 0.00 0.89 
United States 277 15,293.4 11,530.0 15,208.6 46.0 135,642.0 0.83 0.89 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Total sample 520 10,242.5 6,759.0 12,716.6 46.0 135,642.0 0.27 0.16 0.26 0.00 1.00 
 
  
38 
 
Table 3 – Descriptive statistics. Environmental performance and control variables 
Variable  Mean   Median   Std. Dev.   Min   Max  
Environmental Performance (EP)            45.04         44.27           13.82          18.18   81.03  
ERRI scores 1.27 1.18 0.28 -0.03 2.30 
Firm size (a)    21,500    7,725    38,400    142.86     372,000 
Stock return (%) - 37.07 - 37.95             24.73  - 94.36           77.18  
ROA (%) 5.64  5.90          10.69  - 85.26           34.84  
Debt ratio 0.63  0.64  0.19  0.11             1.54  
Firm risk   0.95   0.93  0.34   0.08             2.64  
Agriculture, mining and 
construction 0.10     
Light manufacturing 0.20 
  
  
Heavy manufacturing 0.29 
  
  
Transports, communication and 
utilities 0.15     
Trade 0.12     
Other industries (b) 0.14     
 
(a) Firm size is measured in total assets expressed in millions of euros. 
(b) Because of the reduced number of firm observations in the real-estate, services and public administration industries, 
we grouped together such firm observations in the residual category “other industries”. 
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Table 4 – Correlation matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12  13  14  15  
1 CEO compensation 1.00                              
2 Incentive-based compensation ratio 0.77 *** 1.00                            
3 Environment performance (EP) -0.19 *** -0.31 *** 1.00                          
4 Firm size 0.30 *** 0.05  0.30 *** 1.00                        
5 Stock return 0.11 ** 0.15 *** -0.01  -0.02  1.00                      
6 ROA -0.05  -0.02  -0.04  -0.12 *** 0.28 *** 1.00                    
7 Debt ratio 0.04  -0.02  0.19 *** 0.11 ** -0.08 * -0.25 *** 1.00                  
8 Firm risk -0.02  0.04  0.09 * -0.10 ** -0.27 *** -0.17 *** 0.00  1.00                
9 ERRI score -0.23 *** -0.29 *** 0.17 *** 0.02  -0.10 ** -0.04  -0.06  0.01  1.00              
10 agriculture, mining and construction 0.05  0.03  -0.11 *** 0.03  -0.16 *** -0.08 * -0.06  0.16 *** 0.03  1.00            
11 light manufacturing 0.07  0.02  0.02  0.04  0.11 ** -0.02  -0.02  -0.21 *** 0.00  -0.17 *** 1.00          
12 heavy manufacturing -0.08 * -0.08 * 0.07  -0.09 ** -0.16 *** 0.05  -0.11 ** 0.17 *** 0.15 *** -0.21 *** -0.32 *** 1.00        
13 transports, communication and utilities 0.03  -0.01  0.12 *** 0.31 *** 0.07  -0.12 *** 0.19 *** -0.18 *** -0.11 ** -0.14 *** -0.22 *** -0.27 *** 1.00      
14 Trade -0.06  0.04  0.01  -0.08 * 0.08 * 0.06  -0.04  0.14 *** -0.09 ** -0.12 *** -0.18 *** -0.23 *** -0.16 *** 1.00    
15 Other industries (a) 0.01  0.04  -0.16 *** -0.20 *** 0.07  0.10 ** 0.06  -0.05  -0.03  -0.13 *** -0.20 *** -0.26 *** -0.17 *** -0.15 *** 1  
 
(a) Because of the reduced number of firm observations in the real-estate, services and public administration industries, we grouped together such firm observations in the residual category “other 
industries”. 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5 – Multivariate analysis. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Incentive-based 
compensation ratio 
Total 
compensation 
Incentive-based 
compensation ratio 
Total 
compensation 
Environmental 
Performance (EP)  
-0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
ERRI score -0.304 -0.341 -0.372 -0.436 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
EP × ERRI score 0.010 0.013 
 (0.011)** (0.007)*** 
Firm Size 0.044 0.147 0.039 0.138 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
Stock return 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
ROA -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.208) (0.366) (0.159) (0.288) 
Debt ratio 0.022 0.146 0.023 0.148 
 (0.787) (0.177) (0.773) (0.169) 
Firm risk 0.130 0.106 0.126 0.100 
 (0.006)*** (0.093)* (0.008)*** (0.110) 
Constant 0.233 1.786 -0.058 1.487 
 (0.286) (0.000)*** (0.778) (0.000)*** 
Industry Fixed 
effects 
Included Included Included Included 
 
F 18.570 21.550 17.250 20.020 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.192 0.223 0.201 0.233 
Obs. 520 520 520 520 
Mean VIF 1.76 1.76 1.75 1.75 
Max VIF 2.97 2.97 2.98 2.98 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
